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Abstract
In international crises, the media’s information and orientation function is particularly important in the public 
sphere.  While the news media’s crisis coverage has been well researched and often criticized, very little is 
known about the depiction of crises in political satire.  This study examines how German satirical shows (n = 
154 episodes, 2014–2016) covered the Ukraine, Greek debt, and migration crises and whether or not these 
depictions corresponded to news media logic.  In its attention to the crises, satire follows news media’s 
conflict orientation.  Parallels with news media logic also relate to the information function because the pre-
dominant frame elements in satirical shows mirror governmental positions.  This is different regarding the 
orientation function.  In their evaluation of the frame elements, satirical shows’ criticism of governmental 
positions and their support for minority positions create a counter-narrative for the crises.  Thus, satirical 
shows provide added value for public discourse.
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Satire has a firm place in today’s media 
landscape. Especially in times of crisis, sa-
tirical approaches to the current political, 
social, and economic situation proliferate 
(Boland, 2012; Griffin, 1994; Lewis, 2006; 
McClennen & Maisel, 2014). This is not 
only because bad news invites mockery 
and crises challenge social norms (Lewis, 
2006), but also because the news media 
extensively cover crisis events. Thus, the 
audience already has basic information 
about a crisis, which is a necessary pre-
condition for understanding jokes (Wyer & 
Collins, 1992).
From a social perspective, a crisis can 
be defined as a process (McNair, 2016) 
within which situations or disruptive 
events are perceived as a “serious threat 
to the basic structures or fundamental 
values and norms of a system” (Rosen-
thal, Hart, & Charles, 1989, p. 10). Crises 
can arise from external attacks, inter- or 
inner-state conflicts, or from natural or 
man-made catastrophes. They affect large 
numbers of people and are related to a 
high degree of uncertainty, instability, 
emotional stress, and fear (Perse & Lam-
be, 2017). This makes them situations “for 
which people/publics seek causes and 
make attributions” (Coombs & Holladay, 
2004, p. 97).
In our globalized and highly medi-
atized world with international political 
and economic networks, crises frequent-
ly extend beyond national borders and 
achieve an international dimension (Cott-
le, 2009; Schwarz, Seeger, & Auer, 2017). 
Being a central source of information and 
interpretation, the media are highly influ-
ential in the public perception of a crisis 
(Perse & Lambe, 2017). In national as well 
as transnational contexts, media coverage 
influences public and political responses 
to crisis news, challenges political author-
ity, and pressures politics for action (Gil-
boa, 2005; Miller, 2007). 
Research typically concentrates on 
the news media’s coverage of crises (Ent-
man, 2004; Kampf & Liebes, 2013; Nohr-
stedt & Ottosen, 2014; for an overview see 
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Schwarz et al., 2017). The content of other 
media formats such as YouTube-channels, 
weblogs, left- and right-wing magazines, 
satire, and comedy has received very little 
academic attention so far (Atton & Ham-
ilton, 2008; Bessant, 2017; Fuchs, 2010; 
Harrington, 2011). Our contribution fo-
cuses on the coverage of international 
crises in satirical shows. Satirical shows 
such as late night formats or fake news 
shows have spread around the world in 
recent years (Baym & Jones, 2012) and are 
controversially discussed regarding their 
consequences for society and individuals 
(Hart & Hartelius, 2007; Holbert, 2013; Mc-
Clennen & Maisel, 2014).
Satire is typically associated with ag -
gression, judgement, mockery, play, laugh-
ter, and references to societal norms (Behr-
mann, 2002; Brummack, 1971; Day, 2011; 
Test, 1991). When it addresses political 
issues, satire attacks power structures. It 
provides social commentary and criticism, 
which can add to controversial societal de-
bates and even influence public discourse.1 
Satire can thus be considered “a particular-
ly potent form of political communication” 
(Gray, Jones, & Thompson, 2009, p. 12; see 
also Caufield, 2008) that frequently chal-
lenges established perspectives on events 
with a counter-narrative (Hill, 2013). De-
spite their focus on entertainment, satir-
ical shows can contribute to communica-
tive functions in the political public sphere 
that are typically attributed to journalism 
and the news media (Baym, 2005; Bessant, 
2017; McClennen & Maisel, 2014; Michael, 
2017). Against this background, it is scarce-
ly surprising that satirical shows facilitate 
political learning (Baek & Wojcieszak, 2009; 
Kim & Vishak, 2008).
Studies on political satire predom-
inantly concentrate on the effects of 
these shows (e. g., Boukes, Boomgaarden, 
Moorman, & de Vreese, 2015; Landreville, 
Holbert, & LaMarre, 2010; Lee, 2012; Mat-
thes & Rauchfleisch, 2013). Much less is 
1 A recent example is the “Varoufake-Video” 
by German satirist Jan Böhmermann. The 
satirical video questions both news media’s 
coverage on the Greek debt crisis and the po-
sition of the German government (Bessant, 
2017).
known about the actual content of politi-
cal satire. The few existing studies usually 
provide an overview of the variety of issues 
and political actors that are addressed 
in the shows (e. g., Fox, Koloen, & Sahin, 
2007; Lichtenstein & Nitsch, 2018; Lichter, 
Baumgartner, & Morris, 2015; ; Nitsch & 
Lichtenstein, 2013). Issue-specific studies 
(e. g., Feldman, 2013) that allow for deep-
er insights into the coverage of satirical 
shows are rare. 
This contribution addresses the re-
search gap in issue-specific studies by 
focusing on the coverage of international 
crises in satirical television shows. In rela-
tion to media’s communicative functions 
in the political public sphere, we discuss 
the deficiencies of news media’s crisis 
coverage and how satire might provide 
additional value for public discourse. Con-
ducting a systematic content analysis, we 
then examine how satirical shows in Ger-
many covered three international crises in 
recent years; namely, the Ukraine, Greek 
debt, and migration crises. We discuss 
parallels with and differences from news 
media logic and point out which functions 
satire fulfills in mediated crisis communi-
cation.
1 Crisis coverage in news media  
and satirical shows
1.1 Functions and deficiencies of crisis 
coverage
The media’s communicative functions in 
the public sphere have been discussed 
since the beginning of mass communica-
tion theory (e. g., Lasswell, 1948; Merton, 
1949; Wright, 1986). According to McQuail 
(2010) the media should 1) inform the 
public and indicate power relationships, 
2) provide orientation, interpretation, 
and explanation, 3) promote continuity 
and commonality of values, 4) entertain 
the audience and enable relaxation and 
stress-reduction, and 5) mobilize the pub-
lic towards societal objectives. For political 
communication in the public sphere (and 
thus also for crisis coverage), information 
and orientation are especially relevant 
(Perse & Lambe, 2017). This is because 
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citizens of democracies are expected to 
acquire knowledge and form considered 
opinions about political issues (Haber-
mas, 2006). While information includes 
presenting backgrounds and different 
perspectives on crisis events, orientation 
is provided when the media comment on 
events and take a position (for example, 
regarding questions of responsibility and 
solutions for a crisis). Both functions are 
typically associated with normative expec-
tations of the work of news media journal-
ists as the main communicators in a medi-
ated public sphere (Blumler & Gurevitch, 
1995; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nor-
denstreng, & White, 2009; Patterson, 2013).
The media not only reports crisis 
events but has a “more active performative 
involvement and constitutive role” (Cottle, 
2006, p. 9, emphasis in original). They pick 
up conflict events and situations and in-
corporate them into a specific media logic. 
In this mediatization of crises, the media 
constructs crisis narratives that serve as a 
basis for interactions with other societal 
actors and have real consequences (Hjar-
vard, Mortensen, & Eskjaer, 2015; Walby, 
2015). News media’s performance in cri-
sis contexts, however, has frequently been 
the subject of intense criticism (e. g., Ent-
man, 2004; Hamelink, 2011; Lynch & Gal-
tung, 2010; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014). 
Criticism is directed at the short attention 
span of news media. It is argued that news 
media’s attention concentrates on highly 
conflict ridden situations, provides little 
background information on a crisis, or in-
formation about the later reconciliation 
processes (Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Nohr-
stedt & Ottosen, 2014). During the media’s 
attention span, so-called “disaster mara-
thons” (Katz & Liebes, 2007; Liebes, 1998) 
leave little room for critical reflection and 
verification checks, and are highly prone 
to spreading misinformation. Instead of 
serving individuals and societies with 
“true” and unbiased information, the dra-
matized and unfiltered coverage can mo-
bilize fears and cause overreactions (Alt-
heide, 2016; Hamelink, 2011; Patterson, 
2013). In addition, news media tend to 
domesticate international issues by stress-
ing the relevance of events for the home 
country and by focusing on national actors 
while neglecting other countries’ perspec-
tives (Cottle, 2009; Eide & Ytterstad, 2011). 
Domestication creates the impression that 
the home country is affected by the crisis. 
It is often accompanied by blaming exter-
nal actors (e. g., other countries), thereby 
contributing to the escalation of conflicts 
(Hamelink, 2011).
Information and orientation functions 
are further compromised when news me-
dia follow political propaganda. In times of 
crisis, media’s dependence on official in-
formation is especially strong because the 
events involve a high degree of uncertainty 
and surprise (Cook, 2006; Olsson, Nord, & 
Falkheimer, 2015). Thus, news media often 
resort to information from their own coun-
try’s government and military. This so-
called indexing (Bennett, 1990) of official 
positions by the media leads to a one-sid-
ed coverage, especially when officials pres-
ent a unified front and the government’s 
position is not challenged by opposition 
politicians or representatives from other 
institutions (Groshek, 2008; Roman, Wan-
ta, & Bunika, 2017). With regard to U.S. 
media coverage of the war in Iraq in 2003, 
and the economic crisis of 2008, Jones and 
Baym (2010, p. 281) assert that whilst the 
public “deeply needed critical information 
and reasoned debate, the most influential 
sources of television news instead pro-
vided a steady and often debilitating diet 
of distraction, distortion, spectacle, and 
spin”. A less critical stance towards the 
government and a high focus on solidari-
ty-building during a crisis can contribute 
to a ‘rally around the flag’ effect (Mueller, 
1973). The term refers to expressions of pa-
triotism and support for the home country 
government when a crisis is perceived as 
a threat to that society (Chowanietz, 2011; 
Kam & Ramos, 2008). In the aftermath of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for example, U.S. 
news media became reluctant to criticize 
official language and policies, and finally 
failed to hold the government responsible 
in the lead-up to the Iraq War (Day, 2011). 
While patriotism became lucrative for the 
media, “neutrality was often suspected as 
disloyal” (Wong, 2006, pp. 123–124).
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Both indexing and the rally effect 
enable politicians to engage in crisis ex-
ploitation by presenting themselves as 
credible crisis managers. They can use 
blaming strategies that point at other 
countries and highlight causes for the cri-
sis that are outside their own responsibili-
ty. Moreover, when the media refrain from 
critically scrutinizing political crisis reac-
tions, politicians can strategically use the 
crisis to push their own political agenda 
(Boin, t’Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Olsson 
et al., 2015). 
1.2 Crisis coverage in political satire
International crises such as wars, terror-
ism, and economic downturns are not 
only covered by the news media. They 
are also popular issues in political satir-
ical shows (Lichter et al., 2015). Satirical 
shows are characterized by a strong fo-
cus on political personalities (Matthes & 
Rauchfleisch, 2013; Morris, 2009; Niven & 
Lichter, 2003). One can therefore assume 
that the shows mock political leaders for 
their performance in the crisis. In a nor-
mative view, however, satire’s contribution 
to communicative functions in the public 
sphere evolves from content related criti-
cism on political and societal discourses 
(McClennen & Maisel, 2014). 
With their emphasis on opinions and 
criticism and the linking of entertainment 
and politics, satirical shows significantly 
diverge from news media’s routines and 
principles of depiction (Caufield, 2008; 
Day, 2011; Gray et al., 2009). Even though 
the news media’s agenda serves as the cen-
tral point of reference for the selection of 
issues, the show’s editorial teams mostly 
have journalistic experience that enables 
professional reflection and further inves-
tigation (Krauss, 2017; Michael, 2017). In 
their coverage of international crises, sa-
tirical shows can offer perspectives that 
are neglected in news media coverage (or 
relate to minority positions) and provide 
additional contextual information (Baym, 
2005; Baym & Jones, 2012). They might 
thus complement deficiencies result-
ing from news media logic. Against this 
background it can be argued that satirical 
shows can offer added value regarding the 
information and orientation function in 
the public sphere (see also Lichtenstein & 
Nitsch, 2018). 
Regarding the information function, 
Fox et al. (2007) reveal that satire (The Dai-
ly Show) contains the same amount of sub-
stantial information as broadcast news. 
Satirical shows also convey additional in-
formation, that is, information that is not 
to be found in news media coverage. Un-
like news media, The Daily Show did not 
reduce the Occupy movement to the issue 
of violence, but reflected on the broader 
context and on messages of the movement 
(Young, 2013). The German satirical show 
Die Anstalt provided important back-
ground information to the Ukraine crisis: 
Drawing on Krüger’s (2013) analysis of 
networks between journalists and politics, 
the show highlighted the membership of 
prominent journalists in pro-NATO elitist 
circles and critically discussed journalists’ 
role conflicts when covering NATO issues 
and events in the Ukraine crisis (Die An-
stalt, April 29, 2014). As political satire is 
less concerned with the norm of balanced 
coverage, the depiction of certain issues 
significantly diverges from the news me-
dia. In her issue-specific study on the de-
piction of global warming in two satirical 
shows, Feldman (2013) showed that cov-
erage of The Daily Show and The Colbert 
Report is mainly concerned with scientific 
facts. In American news media, however, 
the principle of balanced coverage results 
in a rather high amount of climate-skep-
tical voices (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). 
Satire serves the orientation function by 
taking a stance in debates and criticizing 
arguments and political actions. Satire 
can therefore be understood as a faithful 
watchdog (McClennen & Maisel, 2014), 
“challenging authority figures and dis-
assembling their rhetoric far better than 
those who actually claim to operate as the 
fourth estate” (Harrington, 2011, p. 39). 
Since satire questions taken-for-granted 
assumptions, it can function as a revela-
tion, exposing “flaws in rhetoric, logical 
fallacies, and rhetorical spin” (McClen-
nen & Maisel, 2014, p. 165). Besides criti-
cism, satire offers orientation by providing 
counter-narratives for events and process-
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es (Hill, 2013). In doing so, satire can sug-
gest solutions for a crisis (Lewis, 2006; Mc-
Clennen & Maisel, 2014; Peterson, 2008). 
When satire diverges from news me-
dia logic and provides an alternative ac-
count of events, it can either help or hurt 
the communicative function in the polit-
ical public sphere (Hart & Hartelius, 2007; 
Holbert, 2013). The desire to present dif-
ferent or additional information carries 
the risk of relying on wrong information 
and spreading conspiracy theories and 
fake news. Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks 
demonstrated that satire can fail to take 
a critical position towards authority and 
join in a rally-effect instead (McClennen & 
Maisel, 2014). Whereas jokes about foreign 
enemies are “safe targets” in times of crisis 
and conflict (Lichter et al., 2015, p. 137), 
criticizing the home nation is a taboo 
subject. This clearly shows in Bill Mahler’s 
comparison of the 9/11 terrorists’ actions 
and the U.S.’ use of cruise missiles in his 
late night show Political Incorrect. The en-
suing national uproar was followed by the 
withdrawal of advertising and ultimately 
the cancellation of the show. 
2 Recent international crises
In recent years, three international crises 
have dominated EU and German politics: 
the Ukraine, Greek debt, and migration 
crises. While both the Ukraine and Greek 
debt crises had their epicenters outside 
of Germany, the migration crisis directly 
affected Germany. However, in each cri-
sis, Germany played a significant role in 
international negotiations and crisis man-
agement. Even though the three crises 
varied greatly with respect to perception 
of the threat, all three of them received a 
high level of attention in the German news 
media. 
In Germany, the Ukraine crisis was 
perceived as a threat to international se-
curity and was associated with the danger 
of war. With Ukraine and Russia being the 
two key countries, the crisis resembled an 
intense confrontation along the lines of 
the old East and West divide (for an over-
view, see Petro, 2017; Roman et al., 2017). 
The crisis started in November 2013 with 
demonstrations in Independence Square 
(Maidan) in Kiev. Protests were directed 
against the government that had rejected 
an economic agreement with the EU due 
to pressure from Russia. The crisis escalat-
ed when Russia annexed Crimea in March 
2014. The annexation was denounced as 
a violation of international law and both 
the EU and the US imposed travel bans 
and economic sanctions on Russia. The 
sanctions were accompanied by open dis-
pute between Russia’s President Putin and 
Germany’s Chancellor Merkel (who had a 
leading position in the EU’s negotiations 
with Russia).
The Greek debt crisis centered on 
fears of financial instability and econom-
ic losses. It had its roots in the earlier Euro 
crisis (2010-2012) when Greece had to be 
stabilized by guarantees, ‘rescue para-
chutes’ loans, and a radical austerity poli-
cy. Poverty, unemployment, and distrust in 
established political circles characterized 
the situation in Greece when the left-wing 
party Syriza came into power in early 2015. 
Its strong ambitions to end austerity mea-
sures led to repeated threats of a ‘Grexit’ 
by Germany and other EU countries, and 
to an escalation of the conflict in summer 
2015. Against EU-wide protests, Prime 
Minister Tsipras conducted a referendum 
in which the Greeks rejected proposals for 
new economic measures. After weeks of 
tension, Greece finally came to an agree-
ment with the EU that kept the country 
inside the Eurozone (for an overview see 
Papaconstantinou, 2016; Tsatsanis & Tep-
eroglou, 2016).
During the migration crisis, the per-
ception of threat was related to issues of 
security and social conflict. The migration 
crisis refers to the dramatic increase of 
refugees from African and Arab countries 
since 2014. The large number of asylum 
seekers placed enormous pressure on the 
EU’s external borders and led to heated 
debates within the EU (for an overview see 
Barlai, Fähnrich, Griessler, & Rhomberg, 
2017). Given the tense humanitarian sit-
uation, Chancellor Merkel allowed refu-
gees free access to Germany in September 
2015. The crisis split political parties as 
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well as German society – to the benefit of 
the right-wing party AfD and the populist 
movement ‘Patriotic Europeans against 
the Islamization of the Occident’ (PEGI-
DA). At the beginning of the crisis, Merkel 
was praised for her decision to keep the 
borders open; but, over time, criticism be-
came more vocal.
Empirical studies reveal that the news 
media have constructed their coverage of 
the Ukraine, Greek debt, and migration 
crises according to principles of media 
logic. This has resulted in the above-men-
tioned normative deficiencies concern-
ing their information and orientation 
functions. German news media tended 
to domesticate the three crises by direct-
ing their attention, for instance, to nation-
al affectedness and national politicians 
(Feng ler et al., 2018; Lichtenstein, Ritter, & 
Fähnrich, 2017; Nienstedt, Kepplinger, & 
Quiring, 2015). With regard to the informa-
tion function in the public sphere, and in 
line with the indexing thesis, studies point 
to strong parallels between news media 
coverage and the official position of the 
German government. Since news media 
also supported the government’s position 
in their evaluation, parallels can also be 
seen regarding the orientation function. In 
their depiction of the Ukraine crisis, for in-
stance, German news media followed the 
government lead in blaming Russia for the 
crisis and supporting economic sanctions 
(Szostok, Głuszek-Szafraniec, & Guzek, 
2016). The migration crisis was first depict-
ed as a humanitarian catastrophe that re-
quired immediate action. Later on, threats 
to security and cultural homogeneity in 
Germany became more prominent in the 
news media and restrictive measures were 
supported (Hemmelmann & Wegner, 2016; 
Lichtenstein et al., 2017). We are not aware 
of any analyses of the depiction of the 2015 
Greek debt crisis in German news media, 
but studies of the earlier and similar Euro 
crisis revealed that news media tended 
to blame Greece and supported austerity 
measures (Galpin, 2017; Nien stedt et al., 
2015). 
3 Research questions
While crisis coverage in the news media is 
well researched, the depiction of crises in 
satire has not yet been analyzed. Based on 
theoretical considerations, our interest lies 
in how satirical shows in Germany cover 
international crises and whether their cov-
erage differs from news media logic. We 
focus on the Ukraine, Greek debt, and mi-
gration crises, which have received a high 
level of media attention in recent years. 
During crises, a strong alignment be-
tween conflict events and media attention 
is common, and empirical studies of the 
three crises have found further deficien-
cies in news media coverage. The media 
domesticated the three crises and showed 
strong parallels with government commu-
nication with regard to the inclusion and 
evaluation of perspectives (frames), for ex-
ample, the attribution of blame to Russia 
in the Ukraine crisis and to Greece in the 
Greek debt crisis. 
Our first research question refers to 
satire’s general attention towards the three 
crises (1a) and to links between the level of 
attention and the principles of media logic 
(1b). Given that news media are criticized 
for their focus on highly conflict-ridden 
crisis situations and for their tendency 
to domesticate crises, satirical shows can 
provide added value (and thus “help” de-
mocracy) by concentrating on other as-
pects (e. g., highlighting the effect on other 
countries and reflecting on events before 
and after the conflict).
 › RQ1a: How much attention do satirical 
shows pay to the Ukraine, Greek debt, 
and migration crises?
 › RQ1b: How pronounced are conflict 
orientation and domestication in satir-
ical shows’ coverage of the three crises? 
Added value regarding the information 
function can be provided if satirical shows 
offer a different frame of the crisis than 
news media does. This can be done by 
either introducing a new frame or using 
a frame that is underrepresented in news 
media. Frames selectively emphasize cer-
tain aspects of an issue and consist of el-
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ements that define, explain, and evaluate 
relevant problems and offer treatment rec-
ommendations (Entman, 1993). The news 
media have frequently been criticized for 
solely mirroring the spectrum of official 
political frames (indexing) and adopt-
ing the government’s crisis frames. Given 
the characteristics of satire, the indexing 
thesis should not apply to satirical shows 
and the addressed frames should diverge 
from, rather than parallel, official politi-
cal frames. Our second research question 
therefore refers to the spectrum of crisis 
frames in satirical shows.
 › RQ2: Which frames are addressed in 
satirical shows’ crisis coverage, and 
do they parallel official political crisis 
frames or differ from them? 
Regarding the orientation function of sat-
ire, added value can be generated through 
the evaluation of frames. The indexing 
thesis implies that official political frames 
are presented in an affirmative way and 
it is known that news media occasion-
ally join in a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ with 
strong support for the governments’ po-
sition. News media’s coverage of the an-
alyzed three crises also points to support 
for governmental position. Satirical shows 
follow a similar logic as news media if they 
approve official government crisis frames. 
Conversely, rejection of frames that are in 
line with the government position, as well 
as approval of frames that are not in line, 
indicate a divergence from news media 
logic and add value regarding orientation. 
In the first case, satire provides critical ori-
entation; in the second case, it provides 
orientation by constructing a counter-nar-
rative of the crisis. Therefore, our third re-
search question focuses on the positions 
towards the frames.
 › RQ3: Which frames are approved and 
which are rejected in satirical shows’ 
crisis coverage and do satirical shows 
offer counter-narratives to official po-
litical crisis frames?
4 Method
4.1 Analyzed satirical shows
We conducted a systematic content anal-
ysis that considers three German satirical 
shows: heute show, Neo Magazin Royale 
and Die Anstalt. The shows are broadcast 
by the public service channel ZDF and 
cover the spectrum of political satire on 
German television. Heute show is a fake 
news show hosted by satirist and sports 
journalist Oliver Welke. It has been broad-
cast weekly since 2009 (Friday nights, air 
time: 30–45 minutes). The name refers to 
the channel’s own news show heute and 
the show concentrates on satirizing the 
week’s political issues. 
Neo Magazin Royale is a late night 
show that started in 2013 on the special 
interest channel ZDFneo. It airs weekly 
(Thursday nights, air time: 30-45 minutes) 
and is hosted by satirist Jan Böhmermann. 
Since 2015 it has been repeated on Fri-
day nights in ZDF. Neo Magazin Royale is 
primarily popular for its stories on social 
media but has lately attracted a great deal 
of political attention when Böhmermann 
tested the limits of freedom of speech in 
Germany by explicitly insulting Turkish 
President Erdogan. 
The third show under study, Die An-
stalt, follows the tradition of cabaret the-
atre and is hosted by cabaret artists Max 
Uthoff and Claus von Wagner, who are ac-
companied by different guests. It airs only 
eight times a year (on Tuesday nights) but 
has the longest air time of the three shows 
(50 to 60 minutes). As opposed to the oth-
er shows, Die Anstalt concentrates on one 
topic per show and is broadcast live.
With regard to their market shares, 
Die Anstalt (12.4%; Sallhof, 2015) and 
heute show (14.4%, Sanchez, 2016) differ 
only slightly. Neo Magazin Royale reaches 
a very small audience via TV (1%, Kyburz, 
2015) but is well received via the ZDF on-
line mediathek (Zubayr & Gerhard, 2017).
4.2 Analysis and Measures
The analysis includes all episodes of the 
three shows (n = 154) that were broadcast 
between January 2014 and April 2016. In 
the 154 episodes (heute show: n = .75, Neo 
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Magazin Royale: n = 61, Die Anstalt: n = 18), 
we identified 584 crisis-relevant seg-
ments (heute show: n = 340, Neo Magazin 
Royale: n = 96, Die Anstalt: n = 148). These 
segments focus on either the Ukraine, 
Greek debt, or migration crises. Since the 
shows often cover crisis issues for long 
stretches of an episode, we distinguished 
consecutive seg ments from each other. 
This was done by applying formal criteria 
(changes in the setting; e. g., from a sin-
gle mode ration to an interview) as well as 
content- related criteria (changes in the cri-
sis-relevant sub-topic; e. g., from causes of 
mi gra tion to accommodation of refugees).
For the 584 crisis segments, we coded 
indicators for domestication and for the 
framing of the crises. Domestication was 
coded, when the crisis segment mainly 
relates to Germany (e. g., by highlighting 
German politicians, the German govern-
ment’s position in a crisis, or consequenc-
es of the crisis for Germany). 
For the framing of the crises, we draw 
on Entman’s (1993, p. 52) suggestion that 
a frame consists of four frame elements: 
“a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation”. We follow a 
slight variation of the four frame elements 
that was put forward specifically for the 
analysis of crisis frames (Lichtenstein, 
Esau, Pavlova, Osipov, & Argylov, 2019). 
Accordingly, a frame entails 1) a problem 
definition, 2) a causal interpretation, 3) an 
attribution of blame, and 4) a treatment 
recommendation. We coded up to three 
problem definitions, causal interpreta-
tions, attributions of blame, and treatment 
recommendations per crisis segment. The 
frame elements were derived from pre-
vious studies on news media coverage of 
the three crises (Lichtenstein et al., 2019; 
Nienstedt et al., 2015), and validated with 
a selection of the material.
In addition, we coded the shows’ po-
sition towards the addressed frame ele-
ments. The position was coded as either 
approval or rejection of a particular frame 
element. Approval was coded when a 
frame element is used as factual, truthful 
information; rejection when it is criticized 
(either implicitly, e. g., by stultifying or ex-
aggerating a given problem definition, or 
explicitly by providing contradicting infor-
mation or allegations). 
In the coding process, the authors 
were assisted by 16 students. All coders 
were trained for four weeks, partly in class 
and partly in teams of three. During the 
coder training, 15 episodes (about ten per-
cent of the material) and selected sections 
from 20 more episodes were analyzed. 
The students were involved in the first 
step of coding – the identification of cri-
sis-relevant segments in the 154 episodes 
(intercoder-reliability = .75, Krippendorff’s 
al pha). In the second step, the frame ele-
ments and positions towards the elements 
were coded by the two authors (frame el-
ements = .71, position towards the frame 
elements = .89).
5 Results
Findings on satirical shows’ depiction of 
the Ukraine, Greek debt, and migration 
crises are presented in a combined view 
on the three analyzed shows (Neo Magazin 
Royale, Die Anstalt, and heute- show). Dif-
ferences in coverage between the shows 
are mentioned if they have some evidential 
value. Our first research question refers to 
the attention that is paid to the three crises 
(RQ1a), and to the extent of domestication 
and conflict events in satire’s crisis cover-
age (RQ1b). 
Overall, satirical shows’ attention to 
the three crises varies considerably. 60.3 
percent of the 584 crisis segments refer 
to the migration crisis, 20.7 percent to the 
Greek debt crisis, and 19.0 percent to the 
Ukraine crisis. The different degrees of at-
tention can be attributed to the degree to 
which Germany was affected by the crises. 
In the Ukraine and Greek debt crises, Ger-
many was merely engaged in international 
crisis management. The sharp increase in 
migration and the resulting political and 
social problems during the migration cri-
sis affected the country to a much great-
er extent. This is paralleled by the fact 
that the migration crisis had the greatest 
coverage in all three shows. However, the 
shows differ in terms of their relative level 
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of attention to the migration crisis. While it 
accounts for 75.0% in Neo Magazin Royale, 
it features significantly less in Die Anstalt 
(61.0%) and heute show (55.6%).2
In depicting the crises, a tendency to 
domestication only shows for the migra-
tion crisis. Given that 81.8 percent of the 
crisis segments refer to events and pro-
cesses in Germany, satirical shows clearly 
increase the impression of German affect-
edness by the migration crisis. Segments 
with a focus on Germany are much lower 
for the Greek debt (28.9%) and Ukraine 
(15.3%) crises.
The shows start covering the crises 
only after they began to escalate. Previ-
ous problems in Ukraine, the tense social 
situation in Greece (that eventually led to 
the election of the left-wing party Syriza), 
and the influx of refugees from African 
and Arab countries are largely neglected. 
Over time, coverage of each of the three 
crises shows a number of peaks that are 
clearly related to highly conflict-ridden 
crisis events (see figure 1). Satirical atten-
2 Attention for the Greek debt crisis ranges 
between 13.5% (Neo Magazin Royale) and 
27.0% (Die Anstalt) and for the Ukraine cri-
sis between 11.5% (both Die Anstalt and Neo 
Magazin Royale) and 24.4% (heute show).
tion to the Ukraine crisis starts and peaks 
in March 2014 with the Russian annexion 
of Crimea. This is when the long-running, 
smoldering conflict in Ukraine turned into 
an overt confrontation between Russia and 
the West, and the crisis gained internation-
al importance. In the following months, 
attention towards the crisis drops signifi-
cantly. Smaller peaks appear during times 
of international disputes (e. g., during the 
peace negotiations in Minsk in Septem-
ber 2014 and February 2015) or during 
the elections in Eastern Ukraine in No-
vember 2014. Afterwards, the crisis disap-
pears completely from the satirical shows’ 
agenda. Attention to the Greek crisis peaks 
with the conflicts between Greece and the 
EU in which Germany had a central role. 
Disputes about Greek debts intensified in 
February and March 2015 after the elec-
tion of the left-wing Syriza party and the 
coming into office of Prime Minister Alexis 
Tsipras.3 From spring 2015 onwards, the 
Greek debt crisis was no longer a subject 
in the satirical shows. The migration cri-
sis receives attention following maritime 
disasters with high numbers of casualties 
3 At the time of the highly conflictual 2015 
Greek referendum, all three shows were in 
summer hiatus. 
Figure 1: Crisis segments in the satire shows over time (absolute numbers)
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(e. g., in April 2015) and incidents concer-
ning the PEGIDA movement (for example, 
its formation in October 2014). From Sep-
tember 2015 onwards, the crisis features 
prominently in the shows. The highest 
peaks relate to the opening of German 
borders and the events of New Year’s Eve 
2015 when Germany was confronted with 
mass sexual assaults committed by men 
of Arab and North African descent. Due to 
the shows’ Christmas break, the sexual as-
saults are presented with a slight time lag 
(with a peak in February 2016). 
In summary, findings regarding sa-
tirical shows’ attention to the crises in-
dicate that the shows provide a similar 
account of the crises as news media did. 
Satirical shows focus strongly on highly 
conflict-ridden events and ignore the pre- 
and post-conflict events. Their orientation 
towards national affectedness and the do-
mestication of the migration crisis further 
indicate that satirical shows follow a simi-
lar logic to news media. 
Whether or not the content-related 
depiction of the crises serves the informa-
tion and orientation function of commu-
nication in the public sphere was deter-
mined by analyzing crisis frames. Findings 
reveal that satirical shows mainly focus on 
problem definitions and attributions of 
blame, whereas causes and treatment rec-
ommendations for a crisis are much less 
addressed (see table 1). Just as for satire’s 
and news media’s attention structures, the 
different emphases on the four frame ele-
ments correspond with the conflict orien-
tation of the media and its little focus on 
contexts and crisis solutions. In both sat-
ire and news media, the strong focus on 
blame can lead to black-and-white-pic-
tures of the conflict parties. 
For each of the three crises, we ana-
lyzed the addressed frame elements (indi-
cator for information function, RQ2) and 
the shows’ positions towards the frame 
elements (indicator for orientation func-
tion, RQ3). We argued that, in opposition 
to news media logic, the indexing thesis 
does not apply to satirical shows. Conse-
quently, the shows should neither parallel 
nor approve official political frames, but 
rather criticize and challenge them with 
counter-narratives of the crises. During 
the validation of the research instrument, 
it became apparent that satirical shows 
tend to criticize frames by focusing on sin-
gle frame elements. We therefore decided 
to present results for the single frame ele-
ments instead of identifying whole frames. 
In the depiction of the Ukraine crisis, 
the dominant frame elements are in line 
with the position of the German govern-
ment and the majority of parliamentary 
parties. The most commonly addressed 
problem definition is that of ‘threats to 
peace and the law of nations’ due to Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea (see figure 2). As 
causal interpretations, political strategies 
and conflicts are primarily mentioned. 
Almost every second attribution of blame 
concerns Russia. This is paralleled by Rus-
sia being openly accused by the German 
government of causing the crisis. Possible 
solutions include recommendations that 
the West should show strength against 
Russia, and that Germany should try to 
de-escalate the crisis. Both recommen-
dations, although contradictory at first 
glance, follow the government’s approach. 
On the one hand, Germany conducted 
lengthy negotiations with Russia and op-
posed the delivery of arms to Ukraine, 
but on the other hand, the German gov-
Table 1: Average number of frame elements per crisis segment
Ukraine crisis
(n = 111)
Greek debt crisis
(n = 121)
Migration crisis
(n = 352)
Total
(n = 584)
Problem definition 1.48 1.49 1.35 1.40
Causal interpretation 0.59 0.70 0.61 0.62
Attribution of blame 1.22 1.15 0.98 1.06
Treatment recommendation 0.35 0.70 0.52 0.53
Note. Coding of up to three problem definitions, causal interpretations, attributions of blame and treatment recommendations per crisis 
segment.
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ernment supported economic sanctions 
against Russia.
However, differences to the official 
government communication become ob-
vious when satirical shows position them-
selves. Most of the frame elements that 
parallel government communication are 
addressed with a considerable degree of 
criticism. The fact that satirical shows re-
ject both options for the solution of the 
crisis (showing strength against Russia as 
well as attempting to deescalate the situa-
tion) illustrates that the shows question the 
government’s competence as a responsible 
crisis manager.
Despite the large share of frame el-
ements that mirror the government’s 
perspective on the crisis, the shows also 
include frame elements that provide an 
alternative view: The shows address the 
political irresponsibility of Russia and the 
West alike as the main problem in the cri-
sis. They also attribute blame to interna-
tional politics including institutions such 
as NATO and the EU. This is especially 
true for Die Anstalt that unequivocally re-
jects the blaming of Russia for the crisis. 
Regarding causal interpretations for the 
crisis, the shows highlight the economic 
interests of both the EU and the U.S. in the 
former Soviet territory. These alternative 
frame elements resemble minority posi-
tions in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
and the Left Party and mainly receive ap-
proval in the satirical shows. Hence, sat-
ire provides a counter-narrative for the 
Ukraine crisis that is in sharp contrast to 
the criticized position of the government. 
The counter-narrative, however, does not 
offer a problem treatment, and thus pro-
vides no orientation for solving the crisis.
Regarding the Greek debt crisis, sa-
tirical shows address several aspects of 
well-known German government commu-
nication. They refer to Greece’s economic 
instability and political irresponsibility 
as the main problem definitions, along 
with attribution of blame to Greece and 
the treatment recommendation to intro-
duce austerity measures (see figure 3). As 
a causal interpretation, the shows address 
the stereotype of the lazy Greek, which 
parallels both government communica-
tion and populist positions in the politi-
cal discourse. However, the shows do not 
approve of the government crisis frames, 
but instead criticize them. They whole-
heartedly reject the blaming of Greece, 
Figure 2: Addressed frame elements and their evaluation in the Ukraine crisis
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the treatment recommendation of auster-
ity measures, and the populist argument 
that the Greek mentality has caused the 
crisis. By contrast, the shows address and 
approve attribution of blame to German 
government critics, who are in favour of a 
“Grexit” and critizise the Greeks’ laziness 
(most extensively in Die Anstalt with 100%, 
n = 12). This relates particularly to politi-
cians of the right-wing party AfD but also 
to minority voices from the conservative 
parties CDU and CSU.
In addition, the shows introduce and 
approve frame elements that provide a 
counter-narrative to the Greek debt crisis. 
They resemble the positions of the Left 
party and minority positions in the SPD 
and highlight social problems in Greece 
as well as addressing power structures in 
the EU. This results in recommended solu-
tions of 1) showing solidarity by invest-
ing in economic growth in Greece and 2) 
fostering stronger economic integration 
within the Eurozone, including the idea of 
Eurobonds. As possible causes for the cri-
sis, the shows point to the economic inter-
ests of Germany and other big players in 
the EU as well as to the 2008 banking crisis. 
Attributions of blame are directed at inter-
national institutions such as the EU, the 
European Central Bank (ECB), and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
administered and monitored the austerity 
program for Greece. This narrative tends 
to describe Greece as the victim of the cri-
sis and attributes responsibility to German 
and EU crisis management.
The depiction of the migration cri-
sis (see figure 4) shows strong parallels to 
the government position in Germany. The 
shows identify the humanitarian situation 
as the problem and recommend the ‘ad-
mission and integration of refugees’ as a 
solution for the crisis. The government’s 
more restrictive position in the months 
after the opening of German borders is 
addressed by the problem definition of in-
tegration, the blaming of both right-wing 
movements and migrants (if unwilling to 
integrate), and the treatment recommen-
dation to limit the influx of refugees. 
In their evaluation of these frame el-
ements, the shows demonstrate strong 
approval for the government’s initial po-
sition. The later and more restrictive po-
sition is barely supported by the shows. 
While the shows acknowledge integration 
problems and support the attribution of 
Figure 3: Addressed frame elements and their evaluation in the Greek debt crisis 
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blame to movements such as PEGIDA, 
they clearly reject the blaming of refugees 
and the limiting of the number of incom-
ing migrants as a solution to the crisis. 
Furthermore, the shows address and 
predominantly reject frame elements that 
are common in populist communication. 
They position themselves in opposition 
to the problem definition that the admis-
sion of refugees and the suspension of the 
Schengen and Dublin agreements would 
violate national and European law. The 
shows also criticize the populist approach 
that identifies the stream of refugees and 
cultural differences as causes for the cri-
sis. In addition, they clearly reject strict 
EU border protection and EU engagement 
abroad (e. g., by establishing transit areas 
in Libya) as a treatment recommendation. 
In line with this criticism, the shows clear-
ly approve of blaming government critics 
from AfD and CSU who are (similar to the 
PEGIDA movement) known for their pop-
ulist criticism of migration policies. 
Overall, satirical shows support an in-
tegrative migration policy that mirrors the 
initial governmental position. They take 
a firm stand against restrictive migration 
policies as advocated by populists, conser-
vative politicians, and (in the later course 
of the crisis) also by the government. In 
doing so, the satirical show’s initial sup-
port for the government position evolves 
into a counter-narrative in the later stages 
of the migration crisis. 
6 Discussion
Given that news media’s crisis coverage 
has often been criticized (Entman, 2004; 
Hamelink, 2011; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; 
Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014), our study fo-
cused on whether satirical shows diverge 
from news media logic. Drawing on the 
Ukraine, Greek debt, and migration cri-
ses, we analyzed satirical shows’ coverage 
of the crises and their contribution to the 
information and orientation function of 
communication in the public sphere.
Concerning the general attention to-
wards crises, satirical shows hardly differ 
from what is known from news media cov-
erage. In line with news media logic, sat-
ire’s coverage of the Ukraine, Greek debt, 
and migration crises is characterized by 
a high degree of conflict orientation. The 
highly conflict-ridden picture of the cri-
Figure 4: Addressed frame elements and their evaluation in the migration crisis 
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ses is furthered by satire’s focus on prob-
lem definitions and attributions of blame 
(whilst neglecting causal interpretations 
and treatment recommendations). The 
shows’ emphasis on blame can be ex-
plained by satire’s opinionated character, 
but easily results in a black-and-white 
picture that news media is also frequent-
ly accused of promoting (Hamelink, 2011; 
Lynch & Galtung, 2010). In addition, sat-
ire’s attention towards the three crises 
varies according to the extent of German 
affectedness. However, except for the mi-
gration crisis and opposed to previous 
findings on news media coverage (Fengler 
et al., 2018; Nienstedt, Kepplinger, & Quir-
ing, 2015), national affectedness is not 
stressed by a domestication of the crises. 
Overall, the quantity as well as the quali-
ty of satirical shows’ attention to the three 
crises are basically aligned with principles 
of news media coverage. 
Regarding the information function, 
the satirical shows also tend to follow news 
media logic. As the indicator for this func-
tion served the frame elements that were 
addressed by the satirical shows. In their 
depiction of the crises, the shows primar-
ily address frame elements that are in line 
with the German government’s position. 
This supports the indexing thesis and re-
fers, for instance, to the blaming of Greece 
and Russia in the Greek and Ukraine crises 
respectively. Alternative frames that con-
tradict the government’s position are in-
cluded to a lesser extent. They usually re-
late to the minority positions of individual 
politicians or opposition parties. Different 
perspectives on the crises, therefore, stem 
from political discourse; satirical shows 
do not present alternative frames for the 
crises. Thus, the indexing thesis applies to 
news media and satire alike and satirical 
shows do not compensate for news me-
dia’s shortcomings concerning the infor-
mation function. 
Additional value for public discourse, 
however, arises regarding the orientation 
function. Even though satire primarily 
uses frame elements that are in line with 
government positions, it mainly rejects 
these positions (thus challenging the in-
dexing thesis). In doing so, the shows pro-
vide critical orientation. This is especially 
true for satire’s coverage of the Greek debt 
crisis, but also for the profound skepti-
cism about the government’s approach to 
solving the Ukraine crisis. The shows thus 
refrain from joining in a rally-around-the-
flag stance that news media are repeatedly 
criticized for. In the Greek debt and the mi-
gration crises, the shows extent their criti-
cism to populist frames that highlight, for 
instance, the stereotype of Greek laziness 
in the Greek debt crisis or insurmountable 
cultural differences in the migration cri-
sis. It can thus be concluded that satire’s 
contribution to communicative functions 
in the public sphere lies in attacking exist-
ing positions (by addressing and rejecting 
them), rather than in providing completely 
new frame elements. This finding is well in 
line with satire’s critical stance on politics.
Besides critical orientation, the shows 
also offer a more productive form of orien-
tation by providing counter-narratives for 
the crises. In the Ukraine and Greek debt 
crises this occurs by approving minority 
positions held by the left political spec-
trum. By contrast, in the migration crisis, 
the shows approve the initial government 
position. This position, however, serves as 
a counter-narrative in the later stages of 
the crisis when the government had shift-
ed towards a more restrictive position. 
Despite format differences, the de-
piction of the crises in heute show, Neo 
Magazin Royale and Die Anstalt differs 
only slightly. Although the extent of crisis 
coverage varies between the shows, they 
are quite similar regarding their degree of 
conflict-orientation and domestication, as 
well as their use and evaluation of frame 
elements. 
In conclusion, political satirical shows 
differ from news media not so much in 
what is presented about a crisis, but in how 
it is evaluated. The small amount of addi-
tional value concerning the information 
function can be explained by news media 
being the central source for satire’s crisis 
coverage. However, given that satire is a 
particularly opinionated genre, the shows 
present manifold evaluations regarding 
crisis aspects. These evaluations clearly 
go beyond a simple mirroring of political 
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power relations. Satirical shows offer a dif-
ferent perspective on the crises and prove 
to be a beneficial addition to news media. 
Their coverage might motivate the audi-
ence to reflect critically on the govern-
ment’s crisis management and to question 
the dominant frames of the news media. 
The limitations of our study are main-
ly due to its restriction to crisis coverage 
in satirical shows. It lacks a systematic 
comparison with news media coverage 
and with political positions. Our compar-
ison relies on general knowledge of media 
performance in international crises and 
the few empirical studies on German me-
dia coverage of these three crises. Also, a 
thorough analysis of indexing would re-
quire the coding of frame sponsors in the 
satirical shows. Future studies should con-
sider this in order to provide insights into 
whether approval and rejection of a frame 
element are linked with specific actors 
(e. g., journalists, politicians or civil-so-
ciety actors). 
Despite these limitations, our results 
facilitate interesting insights into satire’s 
crisis coverage and satire’s relationship to 
news media. Firstly, satire is dependent 
on news media. They serve not only as 
the most important source of informa-
tion for satirical shows but also prepare 
the ground for satire’s critical jokes. This 
is because news media provide the audi-
ence with the information on issues and 
positions, which is a crucial precondition 
for understanding the jokes. Secondly, sat-
ire can compensate for shortcomings of 
the news media and confront them with 
their own weaknesses. Satire might even 
inspire journalists to consider alternative 
story lines for a crisis rather than relying 
on governmental frames. In summary, it 
is reasonable to assume a reciprocal rela-
tionship between journalism and satire. 
Future studies might want to analyze this 
relationship and the interactions between 
satire and news media in more detail. In 
this context, it would be interesting to 
explore whether or not differences in the 
depiction of political issues can be traced 
back to different role concepts of journal-
ists and satirists. 
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